Latin American Inequality over Five Centuries
Most analysts of the modern Latin American economy carry a pessimistic belief in historical persistence: that is, they believe that Latin America has always had very high levels of income and wealth inequality, suggesting it will be hard, or even impossible, for modern social policy to create a more egalitarian society. This paper argues that this conclusion is not supported by what little evidence we have. The persistence view is based on an historical literature which has made little or no effort to be comparative. Modern analysts see a more unequal Latin America compared with Asia and the rich post-industrial nations and then assume that this must always have been true. Indeed, some have argued that high inequality appeared very early in the postconquest Americas, and that this fact supported rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions which help explain the disappointing growth performance we observe there even today. This paper argues to the contrary. Compared with the rest of the world, inequality was not high in preconquest 1491, nor was it high in the post-conquest decades following 1492. Indeed, it was not even high in the mid -19 th century just prior Latin America's belle époque. It only became high thereafter. Historical persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth.
Section 2 places Latin American pre-industrial inequality in context by comparing it with inequality the world around over the two millennia from Rome in 14 AD to British India in 1947.
It turns out that there is little that is unusual about pre-industrial Latin America when that comparison is made. Section 3 offers empirical explanations for pre-industrial inequality the world around over the two millennia since Rome, including late 18 th and 19 th century Latin America. Section 4 uses these explanations to fill in the many and big empirical blanks in Latin American inequality history from 1491 through the end of the belle époque. That is, it uses an estimated world pre-industrial relationship to predict Latin American inequality where no income distribution evidence yet exists: hence, the "History without Evidence" title for the paper. It concludes with four revisionist hypotheses. The hope is that these hypotheses will be used to motivate the collection of new pre-industrial inequality evidence and thus perhaps to overthrow once and for all the historical persistence view that pervades modern debate about Latin American inequality.
Latin America in Context:
What Did Pre-Industrial Inequality Look Like the World Round? 1 We have no evidence documenting inequality for the Inca, Aztec or other indigenous civilizations in the Americas prior to the arrival of the Iberian conquerors. But we can guess.
Recently, Branko Milanovic, Peter Lindert and myself (2008) Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating ancient societies where classes were clearly delineated, where the differences in mean incomes between them were substantial, and where mobility between them was trivial. If class alone determined one's income, and if income differences between classes were large while income differences within classes were small (mainly reflecting life-cycle status and luck), then most inequality would be explained by average income differences between classes. One of the most famous social tables was constructed by Gregory King for England and Wales in 1688 (Barnett 1936; Lindert and Williamson 1982 ).
King's class list was fairly detailed (31 in number), but he did not report inequalities within these social groups, so we cannot identify within-class inequality for 1688 England. Yet, when income variance within class is also available for any pre-industrial country offering social table estimates, the differences between measured inequality are typically very small whether within class variance is included or excluded. Indeed, when comparing any two pre-industrial societies where full size distributions are available, inequality differences between them can be explained almost entirely by inequality differences measured by class differences alone. In short, the lion's share of inequality in pre-industrial societies is and was accounted for by between-class average income differences.
1 Sections 2 and 3 draw heavily on Milanovic et al. (2008) .
5 Table 1 and Figure 1 report what these data look like. The Gini estimates are plotted in Figure 1 against income or GDP (or GDI) per capita. Figure 1 also displays what we call the inequality possibility frontier (solid line), a curve based on the maximum inequality the elite could have extracted at that income per capita. The maximum is constructed under the assumption that everybody but the elite in such repressive societies would have gotten just the World Bank's subsistence minimum of $PPP 300. 2 The ratio of the actual inequality to the maximum feasible inequality (both expressed in Gini coefficients) is called the extraction ratio.
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In most cases, the calculated pre-industrial Ginis lie pretty close to the inequality possibility frontier (IPF). The countries farthest below the IPF curve -with the lowest extraction ratios --are the most advanced pre-industrial economies in northwestern Europe: that is, 1561-1808 Holland,
1788 France, and 1688-1801 England.
The inequality possibility frontier allows us to better situate these ancient pre-industrial inequality estimates in a modern context. The bottom panel of Table 1 provides estimates of inequality extraction ratios for 25 contemporary societies. Brazil has often been cited as an example of an extremely unequal society, driven by a long history including slavery, racial discrimination and regional dualism. Indeed, Brazil's Gini in 2002 is comparable to the most unequal pre-industrial societies in our ancient inequality sample. But Brazil is more than four times richer than the average ancient society in our sample, so its maximum feasible inequality (92.7) is much higher than our ancient society average (60.6). Thus, modern elites have extracted only a little more than 63 percent of the maximum feasible inequality in Brazil, and its inequality extraction ratio is about the same as what we find among the least exploitative and repressive ancient societies like 1801-3 England and 1886 Japan. What is true of Brazil, is also true of contemporary Chile, Mexico and Peru. All three have Ginis today well above the average (Chile 2 This is less than Maddison's (1998: 12) assumed subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 which, in principle, covers more than physiological needs. Note that a purely physiological minimum "sufficient to sustain life with moderate activity and zero consumption of other goods" (Bairoch 1993: 106) was estimated by Bairoch to be $PPP 80 at 1960 prices, or $PPP 355 at 1990 prices. Our minimum is also consistent with the World Bank absolute poverty line which is 1.08 per day per capita in 1993 $PPP (Chen and Ravallion 2007: 6) . This works out to be about $PPP 365 per annum in 1990 international prices. Since more than a billion people are believed to have incomes less than the World Bank global poverty line, it seems reasonable to assume that the physiological minimum income must be less. One may recall also that Colin Clark (1957: 18-23 ) distinguished between international units (the early PPP dollar) and oriental units, the lower dollar equivalents which he thought held for subtropical or tropical regions where calorie, housing and clothing needs are considerably less than those in temperate climates. Since our ancient preindustrial sample includes a fair number of tropical countries, this gives us another reason to use a conservatively low estimate of the physiological minimum. As a country becomes richer, and its surplus above subsistence rises, its feasible inequality expands. Consequently, even if recorded inequality is stable, the extraction ratio must fall. This can be seen in Figure 2 where the inequality extraction ratio is plotted against income per capita for both ancient societies and their modern counterparts. Thus, the social consequences of increased inequality may not entail as much relative impoverishment, or as much perceived injustice, as might appear if we looked only at the recorded Gini. This logic is particularly compelling for low and middle-income countries where increases in income push the maximum feasible inequality up sharply along the steepest part of the IPF curve. The farther a society rises above the subsistence minimum, the less will economic development lift its inequality possibilities, and thus the extraction ratio will be driven more and more by the rise in the actual Gini itself. Thus, the inequality extraction ratio has fallen everywhere in Latin America over the past century or two, and in some cases by a lot: it has fallen by 15 percent in Brazil (from 74. 
Fundamentals: Explaining Pre-Industrial Inequality the World Round
Using this information from ancient pre-industrial societies, can we explain differences in observed inequality? The Kuznets hypothesis posits that inequality tends to follow a bell-shape as average real income increases. Although Kuznets formulated his hypothesis explicitly with a view toward industrializing and industrialized economies, one might wonder whether his Curve can be found among our pre-industrial economies as well. In addition to log average income and its square, Table 2 includes the urbanization rate, population density and colonial status (a dummy variable). The regression also includes a number of controls for country-specific eccentricities in the data: the number of social groups available for calculating the Gini, whether the social table is based on tax data, and whether the social table for a colony includes the income of resident colonists. The Kuznets hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on average income (or its log) and negative coefficient on its square. We also expect higher inequality for the more urbanized countries (reflecting a common finding that inequality in urban areas tends to be higher than in rural areas: Ravallion et al. 2007) , and for those that are ruled by foreign elites since powerful colonizers are presumed to be able to achieve higher extraction rates than weaker local elites, and since countries with weak local elites but with large surpluses will attract powerful colonizers to extract it Robinson 2001, 2002) .
The empirical results confirm all expectations. Both income terms are of the right sign and significant, supporting a pre-industrial Kuznets Curve. 4 The sign on the urbanization rate is, as predicted, positive, but since it competes with population density, its statistical significance is somewhat lower. Still, each percentage point increase in the urbanization rate (say, from 10 percent to 11 percent) is associated with an increase in the Gini by 0.35 points. Colonies were clearly much more unequal: holding everything else constant, colonies had a Gini almost 13 points higher than non-colonies. Foreigner is a dummy variable that controls for two observations (South Serbia 1455 and Levant 1596) that were colonies but where their ancient inequality surveys did not report the incomes and numbers of colonizers at the top. This is therefore simply another control for data eccentricity, and its negative sign shows that being a colony, but not having colonizers included in the survey, reduces recorded inequality considerably (9 to 10 points).
The number of social groups used in the inequality calculations, or tax census origin of social tables, do not affect the Gini in any significant way. This finding is comforting, especially regarding Nueva España's three classes, because it shows that our estimates of inequality are being driven by fundamentals, not by the way the social tables were constructed.
Population density is negatively associated with inequality, although its significance weakens when the two Java observations -the most dense part of the pre-industrial world -are removed. It might have been expected that the introduction of a dummy variable for more densely populated Asia would have caused the effect of density to dissipate. This is not the case, as shown in column 2 of Table 2 . The negative impact of population density on inequality seems to be counter-intuitive. After all, conventional theory -which we will exploit below --would 8 predict that more population pressure on the land should raise land yields and rents, lower labor's marginal product and the wage, thus producing more inequality, not less. It seems likely that this conventional effect is being offset in the ancient economy data by two forces. First, densely populated agrarian societies also had lower per capita income, so this may have been working against the conventional force (since inequality rises with per capita income). Second, more densely populated agrarian societies must have had higher relative food prices than thinly settled societies, so that nominal subsistence had to be much higher to purchase the more expensive foodstuffs, lowering measured inequality and the extraction ratio. The stylized picture that emerges is this: Inequality follows contours that are consistent with the Kuznets Curve hypothesis, a pre-industrial secular rise to a peak, followed by a fall during modern economic growth. The Engerman-Sokoloff team, their followers, and their critics all need to decide which of these inequality indicators matters for their hypothesis and why.
Broad Sweep: Reconstructing Latin American Inequality Trends since 1491
Initial Conditions: What Was Latin American Inequality Like in 1491? Table 4 and Figure 3 use the Gini regression equation (1) in Table 2 and estimates of the dependent variables also reported in Table 4 to predict Ginis for Latin America in 1491 before the arrival of the Iberians, shortly after the conquest (call it 1492), 1600, 1700, 1790, 1820 and 1870. Table 4 implies that the Gini coefficient in Latin America prior to the arrival of the Iberians was 22.5, which would have made it the society with the lowest inequality in the preindustrial world (or at least in our sample of it: Table 1 ). China in 1880 had a Gini of 24.5, very close to pre-conquest Latin America. Dutch colonial Java had a Gini in 1880 of 39.7, a figure which would have been 27.1 without the Dutch colonists (39.7-12.6). Thus, Table 4 implies that pre-conquest Latin America had modest levels of inequality much like all the other poor preindustrial societies in our sample which had escaped being colonized.
Extracting the Surplus: What Was the Colonial Impact Like after 1492?
Given what we know about ancient pre-industrial economies the world around, and assuming that Iberian colonists were no better or worse at extracting surplus than were the other colonizers in the ancient inequality sample (England, Holland, and the Ottoman Turks), the answer to this question is quite simple. Colonies had higher Gini coefficients by 12-13 percentage points (Table 2) It is useful to elaborate that last point: the demographic disaster in Latin America must have contributed to higher (but unknown) GDP per capita and average labor productivity, higher marginal productivity of labor, and lower marginal productivity of land, suggesting that the wage-rental ratio (w/r) went up and that inequality went down. The economics can be made a little more precise. Assume that only land (R) and labor (L) mattered in the early colonial economy, and that technology (A) was unchanged across the 16 th century. If we also assume constant returns to scale, then it follows that
The marginal product of labor and land are, respectively,
so that the wage-rental ratio is
Thus, the wage-rental ratio rises with the land-labor ratio, and the elasticity relating the two is (under these assumptions) always 1.
The elasticity of GDP per capita to the land-labor ratio is α. Table 4 "Mexican production stagnated for most of the seventeenth century, falling by half in per capita terms as population recovered … The revival of the indigenous population … put an end to rising productivity in agriculture." Of course, things were different in the sugar-based plantation islands (Young 2005) , or Joel Mokyr's argument that the Irish famine in the late 1840s raised per capita income of the survivors (Mokyr 1983 ).
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of the Caribbean, but these crude estimates generated by land-labor ratio trends are used in Table   4 to interpolate GDP per capita between Maddison's observations for 1500 and 1790.
According to the simple economics above, the percentage rise in the wage-rental ratio across the 16 th century would have been about the same as the percentage fall in the labor-land ratio. 9 If population fell by Livi-Bacci's 90 percent estimate (from an index of 100 to 10), then the land-labor ratio rose by a factor of ten (from 10 to 100), 10 which implies that wage-rental ratio rose by a factor of 10 as well. As we noted above, and based instead on Maddison's population estimates, Table 4 implies that the land-labor ratio rose by more than 100 percent. We have assumed perfect competition in these calculations which, of course, is completely inconsistent with our knowledge that Iberian colonists introduced coercive and repressive devices so that labor's greater scarcity was not fully rewarded. In more formal terms, the Iberians pushed the wage below labor's marginal product. Thus, the demographically-induced rise in the wage-rental ratio must have been considerably less than 100 percent. But even if it was only 50 percent, it implies pronounced downward pressure on inequality across the 16 th century. Furthermore, it seems likely that land concentration also diminished as labor got scarcer, so there are other reasons to believe that exogenous demographic trends put strong downward pressure on inequality across the 16 th century. On the other hand, improved productivity in extracting minerals from the mines as well as any general improvement in economy-wide productivity (e.g. a rise in A) might have pushed inequality in the opposite direction, upwards. What was the net effect? Table 4 predicts that after the initial effect of colonization, there was very little additional change in Latin American inequality up to 1600.
Inequality Rise: What Did Latin American Inequality Look Like in 1790?
Over the two centuries between 1600 and 1790, a number of fundamentals were at work in Latin America which would have served to raise inequality and extraction ratios. First and foremost, populations partially recovered their 16 th century losses. Interpolating 1790 from 9 The economics is very simple, and complexity would diminish the size of the demographic disaster effects estimated here, but not the direction. For example, if land supply was very elastic (as it probably was in the Americas) then the impact on the land-labor ratio would be diminished. To take another example, while the assumption of constant technology across the 16 th century is analytically convenient, technological transfer from Europe and mining development must have increased A in the formal output and output per worker expression in the text. This point is expanded below. 10 The cultivatable land area of Latin America was 10.966 million km 2 between 1500 and 1800. Livi-Bacci's 50 million pre-conquest population implies a population density of 4.56. His 3-4 (say 3.5) million estimate for c1700 implies a density of 0.31, a spectacular fall of population density over the 16 th century. Maddison's (2008) estimates for 1700 and 1820, yields a rise in population from 8.6 million in 1600 to 12.45 million in 1790. Thus, population density rose from about 0.78 to 1.14, and landlabor ratios fell by about 31 percent. Second, GDP per capita rose from 438 to 650, or almost by half, and urbanization rose from 9 to 14.2 percent, or by more than half. These forces imply that the Gini might have risen from 36.2 to 57.6, which, according to the Table 4 predictions, implies that inequality in 1790 was the highest it got in Latin America over the three centuries between 1491 and 1870.
Revolution, Independence and Lost Decades
While revolution, independence and the 'lost decades' that followed up to about 1870 The economics underlying Coatsworth's statement above is, of course, quite straight forward. Latin America faced a rising terms of trade throughout the late 19 th century (Williamson 2008) . Since it was a primary product exporter, land and mineral rents were driven up relative to wages. This happened everywhere around the poor periphery (Williamson 2002) , but it was especially dramatic in Latin America partly because the region was able to expand its export sectors so effectively, thus to become very large shares in GDP (Williamson 2009 : Table 4 .1).
Since land and mineral resources were held by those at the top, inequality rose as well. Not too long ago, the only data we had to judge the magnitude of these inequality trends were proxies, like the rent-unskilled wage ratio or the GDP per capita-unskilled wage ratio (Williamson 1999 (Williamson , 2002 . Thus, when the rent-wage ratios for Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela (Arroyo Abad 2008: Figure 1 ) are weighted by 1890 populations, the Latin American average rises 7.9 percent per decade 1850-1870 and 6.3 percent per decade 1870-1900, for a total increase of 37 percent after 1850. This rent-wage proxy thus implies an inequality surge over the second half of the century. We also have the more comprehensive belle époque inequality evidence summarized in Table 5 refers only to Brazil and three in the southern cone. That is, the Latin American average misses the heavily populated Mexican and Andean republics. However, Prados de la Escosura also shows that the Mexican income per capita to unskilled wage ratio rose dramatically over the period (Prados de la Escosura 2007: Figure 12 .1b), suggesting that Mexico followed the rest of Latin America recording a steep rise in inequality over the four Porfiriato pre-revolutionary decades. And the Arroyo rent-wage proxy for Mexico confirms the Prados data (the 1870-1900 increase was 27 percent over the three decades). Applying that 35-36 percent increase to the 1870 Latin American
Gini coefficient in Table 4 would imply that it rose from 46.4 to 63.1, making the Gini in the 1920s the highest that Latin America recorded since pre-conquest, even higher than the 1790 colonial peak (57.6), and much, much higher than 1600 (36.2). Any modern analyst who believes that high inequality has been an attribute of Latin America since the Iberian conquest should take note.
Revisionist Hypotheses
Figure 3 When such comparisons are made (Table 3 and Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson 2008) , income inequality in pre-industrial Latin America is found to have been lower than that of northwest Europe, not higher. To repeat, it is not true that pre-industrial Latin America (pre-1870) was more unequal than pre-industrial northwest Europe (pre-1800). Thus, if, as Engerman and Sokoloff have suggested, it is thought that inequality encouraged rent-seeking, suppressed private property rights, retarded the development of 'good' institutions, and thus discouraged growth in Latin America, it must have done even more so in northwest Europe where the industrial revolution first started! In addition, it appears that pre-conquest Latin America had one of the lowest, if not the lowest, level of inequality anywhere in the poor periphery. It also appears that Latin American inequality remained one of the lowest anywhere around the world until the start of the seventeenth century. It can hardly be said that initial endowments and Iberian colonization made Latin America more unequal than other places.
Second, Latin America was poorer than northwest Europe, and poorer societies have smaller surpluses for the elite to extract. Thus, while inequality was no higher, what this paper and Milanovic et al. (2008) call extraction rates (how much of the available surplus was actually extracted by the elite) were considerably higher in Latin America than in northwest Europe.
Whether measured inequality or extraction rates are the best indicators of pro-rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions is an issue that needs to be resolved since they offer very different inferences regarding Latin American growth underachievement.
Third, Latin American inequality over the five centuries from pre-conquest to the present has exhibited immense variance. While the historical literature certainly offers strong opinions about potential explanations, we need far more evidence to document them firmly. By replacing less rapacious indigenous elite with more rapacious European elite, the Iberian conquest appears to have raised, initially, inequality by about half. Yet, the sixteenth century saw very little further rise in inequality, most probably because the demographic disaster produced a powerful downward offset to all other inequality-increasing forces. It looks like the two centuries up to about 1790 saw the biggest increase in Latin American inequality, reaching its colonial peak in that year (Gini 57.6: Table 4 ). What are the explanations for the colonial inequality boom? Was it simply driven by increases in GDP per capita and thus in the surplus available for the elite to extract? Or, did the elite learn more effective ways to extract a bigger share of the same surplus?
Or was it both? In any case, about half of that huge rise up to 1790 was eroded by three decades of war and independence, followed by five post-independence 'lost decades' of economic stagnation. Thus, by 1870 inequality in Latin America (Gini 46.4: Table 4 ) was not much different than it was for all pre-industrial societies for which we can get the data (Gini 44.3: Table 1 ). To repeat, while inequality was high in Latin America as it was poised for its industrial revolution, it was no higher than the average pre-industrial society, nor higher than industrializing Europe.
Fourth, globalization forces during the belle époque pushed Latin American inequality up to historic highs by the 1920s. Although that belle époque inequality boom is not yet adequately measured, it looks like ongoing research will shortly do so (e.g Bértola et al. 2008) . Other primary product exporters underwent similar inequality-enhancing booms over that half century too (Williamson 2002; , but it appears that Latin America had one of the biggest inequality booms, and, even more notable, that the high inequality achieved persisted during the anti-global episode between the 1920s and the 1970s. The latter offers a striking contrast with the industrialized world which underwent a great egalitarian leveling across the mid-20 th century (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 53-62; Goldin and Margo 1992; Atkinson and Piketty 2008) .
The inequality history that makes Latin America distinctive stretches across the 20 th century when Europe and its English-speaking offshoots underwent a secular decline in inequality correlated with the rise of the welfare state (Lindert 2004; Atkinson and Piketty 2008) .
Latin America did not share that 20 th century decline (Prados 2007) . Why has 20 th century Latin American inequality history been so unique, while everything else about their inequality history from 1491 to the 1920s was so ordinary? Maddison (2008) . Missing years linearly interpolated. Urbanization: Bairoch (1993: 388-9, 423) and Sánchez-Albornoz (1974: 30-32, 77) . Latin American 1820 interpolated. Mexico 1820 and 1870 derived assuming percent fall 1790-1820 and rise 1820-1870 the same as for Latin America. Land area : Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008: Gini Coefficient
